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This paper constructs a dynamic theoretical model and calibrates the model with the 
Australian data. The simulations provide new findings which demonstrate that skilled 
immigrants are not ‘job robbers’ but unskilled immigrants have the potential to become 
such. The result that immigrants are not job robbers is due to there having been a much 
larger number of skilled immigrants than the unskilled immigrants in Australia during the 
past twelve years, 1990-2002. The immigration policy adopted by the Australian 
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The economic effects of immigration are always matters of great interest in Australia. By 
the late 1970s, focus on the issue of immigration had switched from the demand side 
consequences, such as an adverse impact on inflation, investment and imports, to the 
labour market with concerns about effects on unemployment (Foster and Baker, 1991). Of 
particular importance was the question: do immigrants rob jobs from local Australians? 
Pope and Withers (1993) and Addison and Worswick (2002) concluded that there is no 
evidence of immigration raising the unemployment rate. Tian and Shan (1999) and Shan 
et al (1999) supported this view and found no Granger causality between immigration and 
unemployment. Chapman and Cobb-Clark (1999) developed a short-run model and 
concluded that immigration improves the job prospects of unemployed residents and an 
increase in employment is more likely the more recessed is the labour market.  
 
In addition to studies based on the case of Australia, a large body of literature 
investigating the effect of immigration on local workers has also been undertaken by U.S., 
French, New Zealand, and Canadian studies (Lalonde & Topel 1991, Altonji & Card 
1991, Borjas 1994, Friedberg & Hunt 1995, Gross 2002, Shan et al 1999, Marr and Siklos 
1995 and Lee 1992). The evidence from these studies is inconclusive. Some of the 
empirical studies find a small or insignificant impact of immigration on local 
unemployment (Borjas 1994, Friedberg and Hunt 1995 and Shan et al 1999). Some find a 
negative relationship. Gross (2002) studies the case of France and concludes that there is 
a negative relationship between unemployment and immigration in the long run. Marr and   3
Siklos (1995) use Canadian data and find that immigration and unemployment are 
inversely related to a small extent. Altonji and Card (1991) use U.S. data and suggest that 
immigrants had an unexpected negative effect on unemployment. Others find a positive 
relationship, i.e. immigrants are job robbers. Lee (1992) finds that immigration has a 
positive effect on Canadian unemployment. Gross (2002) concludes in the short run, 
immigration leads to a temporary increase in unemployment to a small extent. Angrist and 
Kugler (2003) take cross-country differences in institutions among countries in EU into 
account and find that “an increase in the foreign share (the immigrant proportion of the 
labour force) of 10% would reduce native employment rates by 0.2-0.7 of a percentage 
point”. All existing research in this area is based on empirical studies in which the 
analysis mainly uses cross-section or time series data, which rely on the quantity and 
quality of the data used. These econometric approaches use either reduced forms from 
relatively simple theoretical models or somewhat ad hoc forms, neither of which is 
sufficiently comprehensive.  
 
This paper uses a novel methodology which constructs a dynamic theoretical model, 
based on the behaviour of firms, households and the government, and uses empirical data 
to calibrate this model, then runs simulations. This model is able to illustrate the dynamic 
transitions of key variables in both the short and long run, providing important insights 
into immigration policies. This is precisely what existing research based on time series 
data (Tian and Shan 1999, Pope and Withers 1993, Addison and Worswick 2002 and 
Shan et al 1999) and a short-run model (Chapman and Cobb-Clark 1999) could not 
provide.  
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The main finding is that there is no evidence that immigrants take jobs away from the 
local Australian over the past twelve years. This is because skilled immigrants have 
dominated the overall effects. This supports the conclusion from existing research, such 
as Addison and Worswick (2002), Tian and Shan (1999) and Pope and Withers (1993). 
Furthermore, simulations from this theoretical model suggest that immigrants reduce the 
unemployment rate when demands for consumption and education by immigrants are 
taken into account. This is consistent with the findings of the Canadian study by Marr and 
Siklos (1995), of the U.S. study by Altonji and Card (1991), of the Australian study by 
Chapman and Cobb-Clark (1999) and of the French study looking for the long-run effect 
by Gross (2002).  
 
This paper takes a more detailed look at the composition of immigrants by dividing them 
into skilled and unskilled groups. After separating the effect from the skilled and 
unskilled immigrants on the unemployment rate, a new finding is that skilled immigrants 
are not job robbers, but unskilled immigrants have the potential to rob jobs from the local 
unskilled labour.  
 
Section II sets out the theoretical model, Section III shows the calibration of the model, 
Section IV presents the simulation results and Section V is the conclusion. 
 
II The  Model 
 
The framework of the theoretical model is as follows. The economy has one-good, two-
labour types (skilled and unskilled) and three-agents (firms, households, and 
government). The whole economy is treated as one aggregate entity. Firms produce a   5
single good by hiring physical capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour, and then they 
sell this good to households for consumption, to the government for education capital 
investment, and to themselves for physical capital investment. The objective of each firm 
is to maximize its intertemporal profit. The ownership of firms belongs to households in 
this model.  
 
Households supply unskilled labour to firms and skilled labour to both firms and the 
government in order to earn wages. Wages together with the dividends from renting 
physical capital to firms are used to finance the purchase of the good and education. 
Leisure is consumed by households with an opportunity cost of not working. The 
objective of households is to maximize utility by an optimal distribution of consumption 
between goods and leisure under their budget and time constraints and the choice of 
investment in education to upgrade their skill. It is assumed that time spent in schooling 
and expenditure on education are equally important for skill formation.  
 
The government buys the good from firms and transforms it into education capital. This 
capital is combined with skilled labour hired by the government to produce education
1. This model captures the reality of government supplying education in consideration of 
the associated beneficial externalities. The government balances its budget by collecting 
labour income tax and selling education to households
2. The accumulation of physical 
capital, skill formation, education capital and financial assets causes dynamic evolution of 
the economy over time.  
 
Wage determination in Australia has been based on an awards system usually described 
as compulsory arbitration. The main feature of compulsory arbitration is the inflexibility   6
of relative wages. The evolution of the Australian Awards System is towards encouraging 
parties to bargain at the level of the enterprise. An individual agreement with their 
employers, known as a workplace agreement, is also under development. Since 1993 the 
Industrial Relations Commission no longer makes national wage decisions. However, it 
does make safety net decision covering workers, mostly lower-paid workers, who have 
not been able to enter an enterprise bargain (Norris 2000). Under the inflexibility of the 
lower wages in Australia, the unskilled wage is treated as exogenous to present a case of 
market failure which creates unemployment. The skilled wage is endogenized. Therefore, 
the relative wage evolves over time by which the contemporary activities from the 
evolution of the Australian Awards System are well captured.   
 
The role of immigrants in this model is as follows. Immigrants, categorized as unskilled 
labour and skilled labour, provide inputs for goods production and are homogeneous to 
domestic labour in productivity. It is assumed that skilled immigrants cannot work in the 
education sector immediately after their arrival. From the second period after arrival, 
skilled immigrant workers are treated exactly the same as skilled domestic workers.  
 
This theoretical model is an extension version of the model in Chang (2002) and follows 
the general approach of the G-Cubed model (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1999). A step-by 
step construction of the model can be found in Chang (2000). The model is presented in 
Table 1. Cobb-Douglas functional forms are used for goods production, skill formation, 
education production and the household utility function. The model in the steady state is 
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Table 1  
The Theoretical Model 
Firms:                                                                                                                              
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s L : Domestic skilled labour hired by firms; 
G
s L : Skilled labour hired 
by government;  s L : Total skilled labour; 
m
s L : Skilled immigrants;  u L : Domestic 
unskilled labour; 
m
u L : Unskilled immigrants; K : Capital; l: Leisure; J : Fixed capital 
formation;  I : Capital investment;  s W : Skilled wage;  u W : Unskilled wage; F : 
Financial asset; C : Consumption;  E S : Amount of education buying;  s J : Fixed skill 
formation; T : Time constraint; N: Unemployment;  E P : Price of education; r: Interest 
rate;  E K : Education capital; τ: Tax rate; 
G
E I : Government education investment; λ: 
Shadow price of capital; α,  β: Input shares in goods production function; δ: 
Depreciation rate of capital; δs: Depreciation rate of skill; θ: Rate of time preference; 
H : Schooling; ξ: Input share in education production function; Ω: the share in skill 
formation; δE: Depreciation rate of education capital; Φ: Adjustment cost parameter 
of capital investment.  
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III  Calibration of the Model 
 
All data are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). All parameters are estimated 
using data for 1990, the base year of calibration, except for the shares of skilled and 
unskilled labour in the goods production function which are estimated using time-series 
data. Three assumptions are made in calibration. First, the depreciation rate of education 
capital is the same as the depreciation rate of physical capital. Second, the consumption of 
leisure and of goods are equally important for households’ utility. Third, spending of 
money and spending of time on education are equally important for skill formation.  
 
Skilled and unskilled labour are grouped by occupation defined by the Australian 
Standard Classification of Occupations, second edition statistical classifications 
(ASCO2). Skilled labour includes: (1) Managers and administrators; (2) Professionals; (3) 
Associate professionals; (4) Tradespersons and related workers; (5) Advanced clerical and 
service workers. Unskilled labour includes: (1) Intermediate clerical, sales and service 
workers; (2) Elementary clerical, sales and service workers; (3) Intermediate production 
and transport workers; (4) Labourers and related workers. Details of the data are in 
Appendix 2, and details of the parameters and exogenous variables are in Appendix 3. 
 
IV Simulation  Results 
 
In the past twelve years (1990-2002), Australia accepted more skilled than unskilled 
immigrants. Another group called ‘not in the labour force’, including the retired, 
pensioners, disabled, housekeepers, students and unemployed, captures other immigrants. 
Skilled immigrants have accounted for a decreased share in total immigration, 42.5% in   9
1990 down to 26.6% in 2002. The situation is the same for unskilled immigrants, 12.6% 
down to 2.2% during the same period. Immigrants who are not in the labour force have 
increased as a share of all immigrants from 44.9% in 1990 to 71.2% in 2002. Figure 1 
shows the composition and the variation of each group of Australia’s immigrants from 
1990 to 2002. Both skill and unskilled immigrants follow a fluctuating downward trend.  
     
    Figure  1 
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During the same period of time, the relationship between Australia’s unemployment rate 
and the number of in-labour-force immigrants is shown in Figure 2. The number of in-
labour-force immigrants follows a decreasing trend in the period of 1990-2002. The 
unemployment rate increases to its highest record in 1993. Since then, it has also followed 
a decreasing trend. A hypothesis that the unemployment rate falls along with decreases in 
the number of immigrants seems supported by the data. Hence immigrants could be job 
robbers. However, the correlation between these two series is only 0.3 and this suggests 
that the direction of variation of these two series is opposite in quite a number of years. 
Figure 2 cannot provide a clear picture of whether immigrants are job robbers. Thus, a 
closer investigation is needed. 
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    Figure  2   




























The simulation is undertaken in the following way. At year t, it is assumed that there is no 
information on the quantity of immigrants at year t+1 or any year thereafter. Therefore, 
the steady state outcomes for the whole economy, including evolution of the 
unemployment rate, depend on the effect of the current and past numbers of immigrants, 
i.e. the shock for year t includes the numbers of immigrants up to year t and is assumed to 
remain the same as year t thereafter. The ratio of the actual number of skilled immigrants 
to the actual number of domestic skilled workers is used to multiply the simulated number 
of domestic skilled workers in the steady state in order to rescale the size of the actual 
immigration shocks. The same method is used to rescale the shocks of unskilled 
immigrants.  
 
In the period under investigation, numbers of in-labour-force immigrants and simulated 
unemployment rates follow a countercyclical relationship and have a correlation 
coefficient of -0.97. Figure 3 shows this pattern between these two series. This suggests 
that immigrants are not job robbers. Furthermore, immigrants have the potential to reduce 
the unemployment rate. There is no evidence to substantiate the perception in the public   11
psyche that immigrants are taking jobs away from locals. The fallacy of the argument of 
immigrants being job robbers is that only the labour supply of immigrants is considered 
and there is no role to play for the demand side of immigrants, such as consumption and 
education. In the theoretical model used in this paper, both the demand and the supply 
side are taken into account. The entries of immigrants are equivalent to an increase in 
Australian population and they are treated the same as locals. They have the equal wage 
rate to local workers’, the choices to take education for upgrading their skills, the 
necessity to consume goods, and so on. All variables representing the effects from the 
demand side of immigrants are endogenous in the model.   
     
    Figure 3 
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In addition to the lack of evidence to support the argument of immigrants being job 
robbers, the comparison of the simulated and the actual unemployment rate suggests that 
other factors have dominated the variation in the actual unemployment rate. Investigating 
these possible causes is beyond the scope of this paper however it is an area for future 
research. This result is shown in Table 2 and Figure 4. The simulated effect of 
immigration on the unemployment rate varies in a fairly small band and, therefore, has a 
small magnitude in each year.    12
    T a b l e   2  
  Unemployment  Rate  in  Australia  (%) 
  1991 1992  1993 1994 1995 1996  1997 
Actual  9.292  10.492 10.60 9.458 8.217 8.233  8.258 
Simulated  6.551 6.574  6.604 6.639 6.629 6.632  6.646 
 
 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Actual  7.733 6.967  6.317 6.733 6.317 
Simulated  6.643 6.643  6.64  6.636 6.642 
 
    Figure  4   
































V Policy  Testing 
 
Recent disputes over asylum seekers have caused the Australian government to seriously 
re-consider its immigration policy. Simulations from the previous section show that 
during the past twelve years, Australian immigrants are not job robbers and indeed they 
have the potential to create more job opportunities for the locals. It can be noted that 
Australia accepted many more skilled than unskilled immigrants in each year throughout   13
the period between 1990 and 2002. The above result states an overall effect and does not 
distinguish the effect of skilled immigrants or of the unskilled immigrants on the 
unemployment rate. Therefore, different policies have been tested to illuminate this issue. 
Simulations with ‘shocks’ from immigrants in skilled and unskilled categories: both 
ascending by 5%, one ascending by 5% with the other fixed, and unskilled labour 
descending by 5% with skilled labour ascending by 5% over time after 2002
3. The results 
are shown in Figure 5. A policy with an increased number of skilled immigrants 
contributes to the economy with a reduced unemployment rate in both the short and long 
run. This is evidence that skilled immigrants are not job robbers and, ceteris paribus, they 
have the capability to reduce the unemployment rate. However, if the number of skilled 
immigrants is kept the current level and the number of unskilled immigrants keeps 
growing, then the price the economy will pay is to face a higher unemployment rate in 
both the short and long run. This implies that unskilled immigrants have the potential to 
rob jobs from locals and which is substantiated by a decreasing number of local unskilled 
labour working in firms. Figure 6 shows this result. As the finding in Section IV, the 
effect of immigration on the unemployment rate in the above experiments is small. 
 
    Figure 5  
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    Figure  6   








Another interesting point illuminated by the simulations is that an increasing number of 
skilled immigrants injects a growing momentum to the economy and increases the 
consumption of leisure and goods in the whole economy. However, an increasing number 
of unskilled immigrants with a fixed or a decreased number of skilled immigrants reduces 
the consumption of leisure and goods in the economy. This is because an increasing 
number of unskilled immigrants causes an increasing number of the unemployed. These 
unemployed, who do not participate in production but still have needs to consume goods, 
inject a slowing down momentum to the economy. Figure 7 shows these results
4. This 
confirms that the Australian government’s adoption of an immigration policy of targeting 
to the skilled immigrants in the past has helped the Australian economy move towards 
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    Figure  7 
  The Effects of Immigrants on Consumption and Leisure  
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This paper constructs a dynamic theoretical model and calibrates this model by using 
Australian data to investigate the impact of immigrants on the unemployment rate. In 
addition to using a novel methodology, this research also takes a further step than existing 
Australian studies to divide immigrants into skilled and unskilled groups. Therefore, the 
effect of different group on the unemployment rate can be illuminated. 
 
The results show that during the period between 1990 and 2002 immigrants are not job 
robbers. This result is mainly due to the fact that Australia has accepted a much larger   16
number of skilled immigrants than unskilled immigrants. Skilled immigrants are not job 
robbers whereas unskilled immigrants are. The overall impact of immigration on the 
unemployment rate plays a fairly small role in the evolution of the Australian 
unemployment rate. This suggests the existence of other factors that have a dominant 
influence on the unemployment rate. Hence, policy makers should target other factors in 
the explanation of the variation in Australian unemployment. 
 
Immigrants have been blamed for robbing jobs in many countries, including Australia. 
This research finds no evidence of immigrants robbing jobs which supports the 
conclusions from existing Australian research. Furthermore, simulations from this 
theoretical model suggest that immigrants create jobs when demands of consumption and 
education from immigrants are taken into account. This is consistent with the findings of 
the Canadian study by Marr and Siklos (1995), of the U.S. study by Altonji and Card 
(1991), of the Australian study by Chapman and Cobb-Clark (1999) and of the French 
study looking for the long-run effect by Gross (2002). In terms of the whole economy’s 
welfare measured by the consumption of goods and leisure, skilled immigrants make it 
possible for the Australian economy to increase its consumption of both. The immigration 
policy of targeting skilled immigrants adopted by the Australian government leads the 
economy to the direction of growth. However, a new issue which has arisen is the 
increasing share of not-in-labour-force immigrants in the total number of immigrants, 
from 44.9% in 1990 to 71.2% in 2002. The effects of those immigrants on the Australian 
economy cannot be seen by looking at the labour market. The Australian government 
needs to take a close look at this issue to form its immigration policy for the future.    17
Appendix 1 
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s L : Domestic skilled labour hired by firms; 
G
s L : Skilled labour hired by 
government;  s L : Total skilled labour; 
m
s L : Skilled immigrants;  u L : Domestic unskilled 
labour; 
m
u L : Unskilled immigrants; K : Capital; l: Leisure; J : Fixed capital formation; 
G
E I : Government education investment; λ: Shadow price of capital; N: Unemployment; 
I : Capital investment;  s W : Skilled wage;  u W : Unskilled wage; F : Financial asset;  
C : Consumption;  E S : Amount of education buying;  s J : Fixed skill formation;    18
T : Time constraint; P : Goods price (defined as 1);  Z U : Marginal utility of Z; 
E P : Price of education; r: Interest rate;  E K : Education capital; τ: Tax rate; 
α, β: Input shares in goods production function; δ: Depreciation rate of capital;  
δs: Depreciation rate of skill; θ: Rate of time preference; 
µ1: shadow price of financial asset; µ2: shadow price of skill; H : Schooling; 
ξ: Input share in education production function; Ω: the share in skill formation; 
δE: Depreciation rate of education capital;  
Φ: Adjustment cost parameter of capital investment.  





In terms of immigrants, data in 1994-2002 are from Migration ABS 3412 and data in 
1990-93 are unpublished data purchased from ABS. Data in 1990-97 follow ASCO1 
(Australian Standard Classification of Occupations, first edition statistical classifications) 
and data in 1998-2002 follow ASCO2. The category of occupation defined by ASCO1 
are: (1) Managers and administrators; (2) Professionals; (3) Para-professional; (4) 
Tradespersons; (5) Clerks; (6) Salespersons and personal service workers; (7) Plant and 
machine operators and drivers; (8) Labourers and related workers. To combine ASCO1 
and ASCO2, the ratios from ASCO2 in 1998 of advanced, intermediate, and elementary 
clerical, sales and service workers to the aggregate total clerical, sales and service 
workers are used to disaggregate the sum of (5) clerks and (6) salespersons and personal 
service workers defined in ASCO1. 
The mapping between ASCO2 and ASCO1 is as follows: 
 ASCO2  ASCO1 
(1) Managers and administrators  (1) Managers and administrators 
(2) Professionals  (2) Professionals 
(3) Associate professionals  (3) Para-professional 
(4) Tradespersons and related workers  (4) Tradespersons 
Skilled 
(5) Advanced clerical, sales and service 
workers 
(5) Clerks + (6) Salespersons and 
personal service workers (A portion 
applied) 
(6) Intermediate clerical, sales and service 
workers 
(5) Clerks + (6) Salespersons and 
personal service workers (A portion 
applied) 
(7) Elementary clerical, sales and service 
workers 
(5) Clerks + (6) Salespersons and 
personal service workers (A portion 
applied) 
(8) Intermediate production and transport 
workers 
(7) Plant and machine operators and 
drivers 
Unskilled 
(9) Labourers and related workers  (8) Labourers and related workers 
 
   20
 In terms of domestic labour, data are from various issues of The Labour Force Australia. 
Data in 1968-86 are from ABS 6203and ABS 6204; data in 1987-2002 are from ABS 6291. 
This time series from 1968 to 2002 covers three types of classification: CCLO 
(Classification and Classified List of Occupations, 1968-86), ASCO1(1987-1996) and 
ASCO2 (1997-2002). The number of employee by occupation is not available for 1976-
85. The ratios used to split the total employment into different occupation in 1976-85 are 
the ones in 1986. To convert 1968-86 data classified by CCLO into ASCO1, the 
correlation matrix between the two classifications in table 41 of The Labour Force 
Australia  August 1986 ABS 6203.0 is used. This is followed by using the mapping 
between ASCO1 and ASCO2 to calculate the number of skilled and unskilled labour. The 
same methodology as done for immigrants is used for splitting clerks and salespersons 
and personal service workers into advanced, intermediate and elementary groups and the 
ratio in 1996 classified by ASCO2 is used to divide clerk or salespersons for 1968-95.  
   21
Appendix 3 
 
T = 8760;   τ = 0.3;  
G
E I  = 14.711;   α = 0.4;    
β = 0.37;  δ = 0.06;   δs = 0.03;   δE = 0.06;  
Φ = 9.5;   θ = 0.1473;   ξ = 0.1;   γ = 0.5;  
Ω = 0.5;  E P = 0.011;  Wu = 0.3164; 
 
Note:  
1.  The shares of skilled labour (α) and unskilled labour (β) in the goods production 
function are estimated by running ordinary least square (OLS) using data from 1968-
2001.  
2.  The depreciation rate of skill (δs) is estimated by using the number of skilled labour 
in 1990 and in 1991, and the number of higher education completion ( s J ) in 1990. 
3.  The unit of 
G
E I  is billions of Australian dollars. 
4.  The proxy of θ is the interest rate of six-month treasury notes in 1990.  
5.  The tax rate (τ) is estimated by using the tax revenue divided by GDP in the 
financial year 1989-90. 
6.  Time (T) is measured by the number of hours in one year. 
7.  The depreciation rate of physical capital (δ) is estimated by using data of the capital 
stock in 1990 and in 1991, and investment in 1990. The depreciation rate of education 
capital (δE) is assumed to be the same as the rate of physical capital.  
8.  The share of leisure (γ) in the utility function is assumed to be equal to the share of 
goods consumption (1-γ). 
9.  The input share in the education production function (ξ) is estimated by the 
government fixed capital formation in education divided by government total expenditure 
on education in 1990. 
10.   The price of education ( E P ) is estimated by using the private outlay on education 
divided by GDP in 1990. 
11.   Spending of money to buy education and spending of time to study are assumed to 
be equally important for skill formation (Ω). 
12.   The value of Wu is picked to have a ratio to the skilled wage close to that from the 
actual data in the base year 1990.    22
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 It is assumed that lecturers and administrators working in the education sector are skilled 
labour.  
2 To avoid unnecessary complexities, a subsidy rate on investment and a tax rate on 
financial dividends are assumed to be balanced out. 
3 These experiments are carried out using a time frame of one hundred years due to the 
set-up in the computer package. For practical purposes, we look at the results over the 
first eighteen years.  
4 All cases with an increasing number of skilled immigrants show similar patterns. Only 
the case which has a fixed number of unskilled labour and an increasing number of skilled 
immigrants is shown as a representative. Due the base numbers in year 2002 having a 
larger number of skilled immigrants than unskilled immigrants, a 5% increase in the 
number of skilled immigrants ends with a larger number than a 5% increase in the number 
of unskilled immigrants, therefore, carries with a relatively larger extent of effects.  